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Abstract: Because of recent and rapid increases in immigration rates, Italy has been confronted with new forms of 
cultural conflicts. Cultural conflicts have resulted in cultural offenses; these are acts committed and promoted by people 
belonging to a minority culture that are considered to be offenses by the majority controlled legal system. In addition to 
defining cultural offenses and presenting defenses that are presented when cultural offenses are tried, this paper 
highlights pros, cons and potential pitfalls of considering culture under Italian law. Finally, suggestions to improve legal 
considerations of cultural diversity in Italy are presented; specifically the creation of laws to exculpate offenders of minor 
cultural offenses, the prioritization of justifications over excuses as a legal defense, and mitigated punishments in cases 
of major cultural offenses.  
Keywords: Culture conflicts, cultural offenses, cultural defenses, Italian law, criminal law and culture. 
Cultural conflicts affect all levels of social 
relationships between the existing majority culture that 
maintains control over all institutions and the minority 
cultures that are expected to acculturate. These 
conflicts play out in both private and public spheres; 
one of the most notable conflicts occurs when courts 
are confronted with cultural offenses. Although, 
defining a culturally based offense can be complicated, 
numerous authors have expressed the need to define a 
cultural offense (Basile, 2010; Bernardi, 2010; De 
Maglie, 2010; Foblets, 1998); and have therefore cited 
the definition put forth by Van Broeck (2001), “A 
cultural offense is an act by a member of a minority 
culture, which is considered an offense by the legal 
system of the dominant culture. That same act is 
nevertheless, within the cultural group of the offender, 
condoned, accepted as a normal behavior and 
approved or even endorsed and promoted in the given 
situation” (p. 5). Furthermore, the Harvard Law Review 
(1986) situates these offenses in societies, where 
cultural fragmentation has a deep impact also on 
criminal law. One such country that is currently 
experiencing this transition is Italy. The total number of 
immigrants in Italy increased from approximately 
356,159 in 1991 to 4,387,721 as of January, 2013; the 
most dramatic increases were noted between 1991 – 
2001 in which the number of immigrants in Italy tripled 
(ISTAT, 2009; ISTAT, 2012b; ISTAT, 2013a). 
Furthermore, newly imported religions and their 
associated customs and practices further complicate 
this discussion.  
Although increases in immigration rates alone do 
not automatically create culture conflicts, in terms of  
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application of the law, a more homogenous society will 
be more perplexed by cultural offenses. Caputo (2005) 
notes that Italian policies tend to be inspired by severe 
cultural homogenization and a discriminatory attitude 
toward cultural diversity. Furthermore, this reliance on 
cultural homogeneity is reflected in the Italian Penal 
Code report. Bernardi (2010) and De Maglie (2010) 
both note that the report includes the following quote, 
“Lo Stato ci appare come la nazione medesima in esso 
organizzata, cioè come un'unità non solo sociale, ma 
altresì etnica, legata da vincoli di razza, di lingua, di 
costume, di tradizioni storiche, di moralità, di religione” 
(The State seems to us as the nation itself is 
organized, actually as a unit not only social, but 
moreover ethnically, tied by bonds of race, of language, 
of customs, of historic traditions, of morality, of religion) 
(p. 62; p. 34). Finally, Grosso (2006) notes that the 
Italian Constitution is also based on a shared cultural 
pattern of values.  
The intersection of the sudden increase in 
immigration rates, and socio-politically homogeneous 
preferences suggest that Italy may be unprepared to 
consider and legally address cultural offenses. This 
lack of preparation may be a product of the relatively 
few discussions on this topic. Therefore, the overall 
purpose of this paper is to expose the reader to the 
complexity, both philosophically and pragmatically, 
associated with cultural offenses and subsequently 
employed cultural defenses, such as justifications and 
excuses, presented in Italian courts. In order to 
accomplish this task, this paper first presents data 
regarding rising immigration rates in Italy. Next, this 
paper defines culture and explores the relationship 
between law and the evolution of culture. Subsequent 
sections examine cultural defenses, as well as consider 
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whether punishment determinations should consider 
culture as a mitigating factor. The pros, cons and 
potential pitfalls of acknowledging cultural offenses 
under Italian law are then considered. Finally, a 
discussion of how and why Italy should legally 
recognize cultural offenses and therefore defenses, is 
put forth.  
IMMIGRATION RATES 
ISTAT (2009) reported that there were 3,423,651 
immigrants in Italy, in 2008. Of this group, there was an 
approximate 50/50 split between men and women, and 
the majority settled in Northern Italy. Additionally, 
ISTAT (2013a) reported there were over 4,000,000 
foreign national residents in Italy, as of January 2013. 
In addition to this, the immigration growth rate is nearly 
twice that of the national average rate (ISTAT, 2012a). 
However, it should be noted that these are mostly likely 
underestimates because they do not capture 
undocumented immigrants or to short-term visitors, and 
both of these categories may affect rates of cultural 
offenses. As such, it has been estimated that 5 million 
immigrants were reported in Italy in 2011 and that 10% 
were undocumented immigrants (European Migration 
Network, 2012; Eurostat, 2011).  
In addition to the numbers of immigrants present in 
Italy, immigrants’ countries of origin, religions, and 
economic statuses are worth noting. According to 
ISTAT (2013b), 2012 data indicate that most 
immigrants came from either Eastern Europe (Romania 
and Albania) or Northern Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt). Although ascertaining exact religious affiliation 
data from Italy can be complicated, data indicate that 
estimates of Catholics in Italy have decreased in recent 
years. EURISPES (2010) indicate that 76.5% of Italians 
report that they are Catholic compared to EURISPES 
(2006) data that indicated 87.8% was Catholic. Reports 
also indicate that approximately 33% of immigrants 
practice Catholicism and 11% are atheist or agnostic, 
the remaining immigrants practice other religions such 
as Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism (Institute of Caritas-
Migrantes, 2011). Finally, the rate of unemployment is 
reported to be higher among immigrants than nationals, 
14.1% versus 10.7% respectively. Collectively the data 
reveal that immigration rates in Italy are rapidly 
increasing, newly imported religions are also 
increasing, and that new immigrants are more likely to 
be unemployed. Therefore, it is safe to assert that 
immigrants in Italy, in general, represent an ethnic and 
religious minority, and also are economically 
disadvantaged. These factors must be considered 
when discussing cultural conflicts in emerging 
intercultural societies.  
CULTURAL: A COMPLEX WHOLE 
Basile (2010) notes that Tylor (1871) considers 
culture to be a complex whole, which includes every 
human activity; moreover, culture is something 
acquired, not inborn in the individuals. Furthermore, 
Basile also references Kluckhohn and Kroeber (1952) 
who suggest that cultural systems consist of explicit 
and implicit patterns of behavior, in which people learn 
and teach through symbols, as a means of 
summarizing and transmitting ideals. Geertz (1973) 
also considers the importance of the transference of 
symbols, "Culture is a historically transmitted pattern of 
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of 
which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their 
knowledge about and attitudes toward life" (p. 89). 
Therefore, culture is not a static system; a pure culture 
does not exist. As a result, culture does not exist in and 
of itself, but only in connection with a group. If 
individuals could not change and rearrange their 
patterns of behavior with reference to their life 
experiences, culture would cease to exist.  
The transmission of cultural traditions and values 
occur at least twice for persons who are minorities in a 
society, first, through the process of enculturation. 
Enculturation is a cultural process by which individuals 
are influenced by their own historical culture (most 
often during childhood), consciously or even 
unconsciously. It may be defined as the process by 
which individuals acquire the knowledge, skills, 
attitudes, and values (all of them can be called as 
"ingroup values") that enable them to become 
functioning members of their societies (Foblets, 1998). 
"Individuals, because of enculturation, feel compelled 
to respond to stimuli in differing ways. Culture affects 
their perceptions and behavior in powerful ways, 
without being conscious of it" (Renteln, 2009, p. 796).  
Next, minority groups (either indigenous or foreign) 
may have their cultural traditions contested, 
challenged, or changed in some other way that forces 
them to adapt to the majority culture; this is known as 
the acculturation process. Acculturation can be 
described as the process by which individuals 
rearrange and change their own cultural values 
because of blending with other cultural patterns (Van 
Broeck, 2001). Minorities may spontaneously 
acculturate, but it is more likely that the dominant group 
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compels the minority group to acculturate by imposing 
their cultural values upon them, and encouraging 
and/or forcing the minority group to abandon their 
culture; in this way acculturation becomes an 
homogenization process. However, the social reality is 
that some minority groups, when faced with the 
pressure to assimilate to the dominant culture, do not 
always abandon their own values. On the contrary, 
core values can be enshrined and reinforced, in order 
to preserve one’s traditional identity. Subsequently, 
minorities may be more dependent on their social 
groups, further reinforcing the need to preserve their 
cultural identity. In this sense, although the majority 
culture wants the minority to abandon his/her values 
and "acculturate", this process could produce minority 
culture members who are more vested in preserving 
their cultural origin. 
In conclusion, culture is a dynamic, complex 
manifestation of history and values, often embodied in 
symbols. Members of a group fluidly transmit and 
inherit these symbols, consciously or otherwise through 
the enculturation process and are then confronted with 
the transmissions of culture through acculturation 
process when they become or realize that they are a 
minority in the larger society. Furthermore, intercultural 
societies may have a greater set of problems as these 
societies are categorized by daily interactions between 
the majority and minority groups (Valier, 2003). 
 Although culture is a multifaceted concept, 
pertaining to race, class, sex, sexuality, religion, 
nationality, etc., this paper will focus on the aspects of 
culture in which the individual is influenced by a system 
of normative rules, embodied in traditions and mores, 
that define how the individual member of the minorities 
groups is likely to act in particular circumstances based 
upon his/her self-perceived identity. Furthermore, it is 
arguable that people consolidate their identity in acting 
in compliance with their traditions, because on the one 
hand, traditions act as a compelling factor for members 
who share them; but on the other hand, they represent 
one's deep identity against disintegration when persons 
from differing cultures interact. These interactions can 
result in cultural conflicts. Although cultural conflicts 
can result from the same list of demographic factors 
listed above, this paper will focus on cultural conflicts 
resulting from clashes between non-Catholic, poor, 
immigrant minorities and Italian law, which is the most 
affective homogenizing instrument of the majority 
culture. 
CULTURAL OFFENSES: A CLASH BETWEEN NEW 
CULTURES AND ESTABLISHED LAWS 
Campbell (2012) points out that, as noted by Gustav 
Radbruch, “law is a cultural phenomenon”; however, 
law does not generally explain its relationship to culture 
or acknowledge the culturally motivated origins of such 
law. Even more so, criminal law is arguably further 
linked to culture, because of its innate role to defend 
values and the national identity. If culture is seen as a 
social scheme conveying implicit or explicit patterns of 
behaviors, law should be considered one of the most 
binding and broad agencies able to influence actions. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that penal codes are 
the most powerful weapon that the majority culture 
possesses in terms of maintaining control over minority 
groups (Baratta, 1976). Consequently, the law enforces 
the norms of the dominant culture in order to maintain 
its dominance (Campbell, 2012; Post, 2003). 
Nevertheless, some requirements are needed in order 
to assess if a cultural conflict amounts to a true cultural 
offense.  
De Maglie (2010) lists what is required to define a 
cultural offense; firstly, there has to be a relevant link 
between the offense and the cultural background of the 
defendant. Therefore, the defendant’s cultural mores 
must be able to "explain" the core of the fact. Secondly, 
it must be established that the cultural motivation can 
be generalized; that is to say that the cultural offense 
must not be motivated by the offender's personal 
beliefs, but rather by the culture and heritage of the 
minority group to which the defendant belongs. 
Nevertheless, this ascertainment must always consider 
that cultural behavioral patterns are not standardized, 
but they vary due to social positions; Van Broeck 
(2001) notes, “when dealing with cultural offenses, that 
one does not have to ask the question whether or not 
every member of that culture should act the same way 
in the circumstances at hand. Rather, the question 
should be whether or not the offender should have 
reacted as he or she did” (p. 11).  
In addition, Renteln (2004) notes that cultural 
evidence should be considered, as culture shapes 
cognition and conduct of individuals. Furthermore, 
respecting one’s cultural identity is considered to be a 
"polyethnic right" that immigrants should be entitled to, 
although they have no prior relationship with the host 
country (Meer & Modood, 2012). This is of particular 
importance as Italy rapidly becomes an intercultural 
country. Although Italy has been considered for 
centuries a multicultural country (i.e., regional 
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differences resulting in varying dialects, customs and 
rituals), increasing rates of non-Catholic, poor, 
immigrants have created tension. In this way, Italy is 
not different from other Western societies affected by 
globalization trends. Therefore, Italian law should focus 
consider an offender’s culture; this consideration 
should be conveyed through cultural defenses. 
Justifications and excuses as "cultural defenses": 
Should culture negate responsibility? 
The definition of a cultural defense is not contained 
in any statutes or official report, however the term has 
been discussed by several authors (Chiu; 1994; 
Foblets, 1998; Harvard Law Review, 1986; Mezzetti, 
2013; Renteln, 2009; Van Broeck, 2001). A cultural 
defense pertains to any doctrine that recognizes a 
defendant’s “cultural background to negate or mitigate 
criminal liability” (Kim, 1997, pp. 102 - 103). Cultural 
defenses, even in the most multicultural of societies, 
such as the U.S., are frowned upon because they have 
been viewed as incompatible with the Rule of Law 
(Heller, 2012). Furthermore, Italian law does not 
recognize such defenses, given the fact that it has only 
recently been confronted with such considerations 
(Monticelli, 2003). Therefore, we cannot reference 
specific Italian cases in which a cultural defense was 
officially used. As such, we put forth two examples of 
widely known U.S. cases; these cases are often cited 
in Italian legal scholarship. In the case People v. 
Kimura, No. A-09113 (L.A. Sup. Ct. 1985), a Japanese-
American woman attempted to commit oyako-shinju 
(parent-child suicide) after learning that her husband 
was unfaithful. It was argued that killing yourself and 
your children is a customary response in her situation. 
She was sentenced to probation as a result of a 
temporary insanity defense, on account of the cultural 
conflict in which she had found herself.  
Additionally, in People v. Moua, n. 315972-0 
(Fresno County), Kong Moua, of Hmong culture, was 
accused of raping and kidnapping a woman of his 
group, after performing the required courtship. He 
claimed that he wanted to realize zij poj niam or 
marriage by capture, according to his cultural tradition. 
The defendant argued that he had made a mistake of 
fact, compelled by his cultural beliefs about zij poj 
niam. The Court allowed him to enter a plea for a 
reduced false imprisonment charge and completely 
dropped the rape charge, although the Hmong 
community and victim family did not recognize the fact 
as zij poj niam.  
Although Italian law does not recognize the general 
concept of a Common Law "defense", and Italian law 
does not provide a specific doctrine to convey 
offender's cultural background in the trial, judges tend 
to use justifications and excuses when presented with 
a cultural offense (Monticelli, 2003). Under Italian law 
there are differences between what could be 
considered to be justifications and excuses. Among 
several doctrines that can be used in a trial to put 
forward cultural factors, the exercise of a right 
Justification (Article 51 of the C.P.) and the mistake of 
law Excuse (Article 5 of the C. P.) represent the most 
noteworthy references to this issue.  
Justifications  
Justifications, such as self-defense or the exercise 
of a right, serve as just causes for committing an act 
that would otherwise be unlawful (Horowitz, 1986). 
They are considered to be the point at which social 
conflicts can be addressed by criminal law in that 
justifications reflect the social order of interests since 
justified acts are not considered to be socially 
undesirable facts by law (Roxin, 1973). Therefore, the 
person responsible for a justified act does not have to 
be rehabilitated through punishment. Even when a 
justified act is not considered to be a good action (e.g., 
the death of the offender), justifications always reflect 
what the law considers to be the right action to take in 
a particular case. Furthermore, justifications discourage 
crimes by legitimating a forcible response to them. As a 
result, they may be applied also to a third-party who 
assists the actor (Horowitz, 1986). Moreover, the 
perpetrator who becomes the victim of a justified action 
(e.g., self-defense) has no right to defend him/herself, 
whereas the perpetrator who becomes the victim of an 
excused act has the right to defend against it. 
Article 51 of the Codice Penale (C.P.) justifies 
offenses committed by an offender who is practicing a 
right, because the law cannot forbid an act that is also 
considered to be an exercise of a right. But this 
doctrine does not define what a right is and what the 
boundaries are; therefore this doctrine is widely 
criticized by some authors. For instance, Viganò (2006) 
notes that this doctrine seems to place these rights 
over the offense, rather than describing the limits of the 
right in relation to the offense.  
Therefore, the question is whether the right to one’s 
culture justifies offenses prohibited by law. To answer 
this question, one must first consider that culture as a 
human right, is recognized under various Italian laws 
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and International Covenants. Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) enacted in 1978 stated that ethnic and 
religious minority groups cannot be deprived of the 
right to have their own cultural life and to practice their 
own religion and language with their other members of 
their group. In addition, Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 18 of the 
ICCPR and Articles 2, 19, and 21 of the Italian 
Constitution also establishes that persons have the 
right to freedoms of thought, conscience and religion, 
including religious practices.  
Although it seems culture is recognized as a 
fundamental human right, inner and outer boundaries 
of the concept need to be defined in order to balance it 
with other important interests that can require criminal 
law enforcement. For instance, the act must be 
justifiable and proven to be an exercise of the person’s 
rights; the defendant’s intent is not enough to make the 
act lawful (Del Corso, 2011; Viganò, 2006). 
Furthermore, the type of offense committed must be a 
consideration. For instance, offenses that offend 
supreme interests must be excluded from justification. 
We should note that supreme interests under Italian 
law cannot be listed or readily defined, as they emerge 
in judicial evaluations. However, rights explicitly defined 
as "inviolable" by the Italian Constitution or 
international covenants can be considered supreme 
interests; they represent core values of Italian society. 
Supreme interests can be set aside only when specific 
legal conditions occur, but hardly ever for cultural 
factors. Furthermore, Viganò (2006) and Provera 
(2010) deem that religious freedom cannot be limited to 
worship, promotion and religious beliefs, but it has to 
include the freedom to live according to one’s own 
beliefs; that is a concept very similar to culture. 
Therefore, neither religious freedom nor the right to 
culture can justify the actions and therefore exempt 
from punishment, a defendant who has offended a 
supreme interest such as the deprivation of life, 
freedom, and sexual liberty, for instance, in order to 
exercise religious beliefs or right to uphold cultural 
norms.  
It is arguably easier to exclude from justification, 
offenses that are meant to inflict serious harm (e.g., 
murder or rape) while upholding cultural norms. 
However, the more complex discussion pertains to 
offenses that do not offend supreme interests and/or 
those that are trivial or not very harmful, such as 
bigamy, incest (between adults), the possession of 
ritual (illegal) drugs, environmental crimes (e.g., the 
throwing of human remains in nature), and the 
criminalization of wearing traditional clothing (burqas 
and turbans). In fact, if law punished such cultural 
offenses, rehabilitation and social cohesion alike would 
be made impossible. Italian judges seem to accept this 
premise. For instance, the Court of Cremona (sent. 
19/02/09, n. 15) acquitted a Sikh worshipper of illegal 
weapon possession (Sikhs carry a small knife called 
kirpan), because Italian law 110/1975 does not forbid 
weapon possession when a "justifiable reason" is 
presented. The judge issued an acquittal and noted 
that the act was justified as the defendant has a right to 
exercise his religious freedom (art. 19 Cost). In another 
case described by Gatta (2009), a woman wearing a 
burqa was before the court for violating the anti-
terrorism law 152/1975. The law prevents people from 
being unrecognizable, by helmets, scarfs and anything 
else; however, the law does not forbid covering ones-
self when there is a "justifiable reason". The woman 
was eventually acquitted, but the Court did not evaluate 
if a cultural factor could have amounted to a "justifiable 
reason.” Instead, the acquittal was reached, according 
to the judge, because the woman had not performed a 
crime, since she had uncovered her face, when asked 
by a policewoman (in a private room), in order to be 
identified. 
In conclusion, although an intercultural society has 
to put some limits on individualized expressions of 
behavior, the right to culture should be prioritized when 
there is no risk of endangering human rights or 
offending against supreme interests. Therefore, cultural 
differences must be protected through criminal law 
when they represent a way to preserve minority groups 
from majority interference. External protections, 
according to Kymlicka (1995) such as statutory 
exemptions from dress codes and permission to use 
reasonable amount of ritual drugs should be afforded to 
minority cultures.  
Excuses 
Excuses, on the contrary, are an exculpatory 
category by which the actor is exempted by 
punishment on account of abnormal conditions (e.g., 
minor age, insanity, unavoidable mistake of law) 
making her/him not blameworthy, as s/he could not 
have been required to comply with the law in such a 
case. Excuses are considered to be the most 
applicable criminal law category for cultural evidence 
as they require an individualized judgment; and 
specifically the Article that addresses the Mistake of 
Law would best apply in Italy. The Mistake of Law is an 
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excuse that is put forth under Article 5 of the C.P. 
Italian criminal law establishes that the defendant can 
be excused when ignoring criminal rules, only provided 
that the Mistake of Law is declared unavoidable. It can 
involve either absolute ignorance of the law or 
ignorance /mistake through which the defendant is 
aware of the law but believes that s/he is acting 
lawfully.  
Italian judges, confronted with cultural offenses, 
attribute mistake of law to inadequate social 
integration; as a result, the defendant earns a complete 
acquittal if such defense is proved (Basile, 2010; 
Bartoli, 2005; Bernardi, 2006). This doctrine is widely 
used to put forward cultural factor by Italian judges. For 
example, in a recent case (Cass. pen., sez. VI, sent. 
22/06/2011, n. 43646) annotated by D’Ippolito (2012) a 
Nigerian woman, accused of unauthorized exercise of 
medical science (she had her son circumcised by 
another woman) was excused. The Court deemed that 
she did not know Italian law and her Mistake of Law 
was declared unavoidable, on account of her scarce 
social integration in Italian society. Although this 
doctrine is widely used by Italian judges, it may not be 
the most appropriate; this paper will address our 
concerns with this application in a subsequent section.  
Both justifications and excuses lead to an acquittal 
when the facts of the case support such a 
determination. However some cultural offenses, 
because of their seriousness, cannot be acquitted on 
account of a cultural factor. In such cases, the cultural 
background of the defendant may still be considered; 
however, the consideration is applied at the sentencing 
stage.  
Do Punishments in Italy Consider Culture? 
When an acquittal cannot be achieved through a 
cultural defense, for instance in cases in which the 
cultural offender violates the supreme interests, cultural 
factors can be considered at the punishment stage. 
This consideration is indirectly referenced under the 
Italian Constitution and directly referenced in Italian 
case law; although it should be noted that there is a 
paucity of case law that directly references culture at 
sentencing.  
Despite the Constitution’s loose or indirect 
reference to punishment goals, Moccia (1992) notes 
Italian judges do not explain their reasoning when 
sentencing and they are not prone to consider 
constitutionally binding punishment aspirations to be 
obligatory. As a result, Italian case law in which cultural 
factors have had a mitigating effect, or at least put forth 
a discussion about this issue, is very scarce.  
Nevertheless, there is a case in which the 
defendant’s culture was considered at sentencing. In 
the case Cass. Pen., VI sez. (26/12/08, n. 46300) a 
Muslim father was accused of child abuse for battering 
his daughter in order to reinforce rules put forth in the 
Quran. The defendant argued that criminal law should 
have considered his cultural values before charging 
him. He denied the existence of mens rea on account 
of a cultural factor; he argued that battering is 
considered to be a means of education in his culture. 
The Court rejected his pleading, because constitutional 
values are an “insurmountable barrier” that prevents 
defendants from introducing customs, usages and rules 
that violate human rights. Although he was convicted, 
the Court of Cassation decided to take defendant's 
cultural background into consideration at sentencing to 
ensure that the punishment served a rehabilitative 
purpose. Unfortunately, the exact punishment was not 
published; this is common under Italian law. The 
Supreme Court of Cassation does not generally 
establish the actual punishment; instead it delegates 
this responsibility to inferior courts whose verdicts are 
rarely published. 
In contrast, there was a case in which the 
defendant’s culture was considered at sentencing to be 
justification for increasing the sentence. The Court of 
Padova, in sent. 09/06/06, n. 446, condemned two 
Pakistani men, accused of rape; the judge deemed that 
“the more individual and cultural conditions are different 
from mainstream culture, the more severe must be 
punishment, in order to have a deterrent impact on 
society.” The sentence therefore was harsher, in spite 
of the defendants' request for a lesser punishment on 
account of a cultural factor.  
Although there is a paucity of case law and statute 
references to cultural consideration at sentencing, 
there does seem to be enough to signal that Italian law 
can incorporate cultural considerations at sentencing. 
However, in cases that violate the supreme interests, 
Italian law must balance at least two goals of criminal 
law. On one hand, there is a cultural offender 
compelled by his/her cultural dogmas and is arguably 
less blameworthy because of the enculturation 
phenomenon. However, on the other hand a supreme 
interest has been violated that has produced a victim 
and affected public sentiment.  
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The Pros, Cons and Potential Pitfalls of 
Considering Culture 
This section examines the importance of cultural 
considerations as applied at all stages of Italian law, 
the creation of laws, the enforcement of laws, and the 
punishment of offenses. However, this section also 
recognizes that such considerations cannot be 
achieved without acknowledging complex dilemmas, 
confronting competing interests, and encountering 
potential obstacles.  
Pros 
There is both theoretical and pragmatic value in 
recognizing the perspectives of varied cultures when 
creating criminal laws. However, we must first 
acknowledge that these benefits exist when applied to 
matters that do not offend the supreme interests; De 
Maglie (2010) notes that criminal law should not 
intervene in social group dynamics, when offenses do 
not involve supreme interests. However, even in cases 
that do offend the supreme interest, there are still 
benefits to considering culture; the law may not 
exculpate the offender, but it may benefit from 
punishing the offender less harshly.  
Advocates of cultural diversity argue that cultural 
pluralism is a value in itself (Harvard Law Review, 
1986; Kim, 1997). The pursuit of pluralism is worth 
protecting even through an exculpatory or mitigating 
defense. Otherwise, as the Harvard Law Review (1986) 
notes, there is an "overkill" risk; "in the zeal to quash 
certain undesirable values or manifestation of those 
values, the majority may inadvertently destroy 
desirable values as well" (p. 1302). In addition, the 
acknowledgment of cultural factors can produce more 
practical benefits; removing punishment for minor 
cultural offenses or enacting less punishment for major 
ones, can promote a more peaceful relationship 
between the cultural groups that co-exist in a society. 
This may foster social cohesion, which is an implicit 
punishment goal noted in the Italian Constitution. It is 
also arguable that recognizing cultural factors can be a 
way to rehabilitate the society; Baratta (1976) notes 
that before changing excluded people, we might 
change an excluding society by addressing the 
exclusion process. Furthermore, the promotion of multi-
culturally inclusive policies and laws are inspired by the 
pursuit of equality; they acknowledge that existing 
cultural differences need to be preserved and/or 
recognized, as minority groups may not have the power 
to preserve or promote their culture. Authors report this 
trend in Anglo-Saxon countries (Basile, 2010; Bernardi, 
2006; De Maglie, 2010). For instance, laws that 
endorse affirmative action policies in the United States 
appreciate the need to recognize culture as an integral 
part of an inclusive society in which the interests of 
diverse groups are valued. Such laws strive to prevent 
inequality in education, work and other public sectors. 
Furthermore, the British Road Traffic Act (1988) allows 
Sikh people to wear turbans instead of helmets and the 
Slaughterhouses Act (1974) allows Muslims and Jews 
to slaughter animals according to their customs, even if 
the act is considered to be animal mistreatment. 
“Treating persons raised in a foreign culture differently 
should not be viewed as a exercise in favoritism, but 
rather as a vindication of the principles of fairness and 
equality that underlie a system of individualized justice" 
(Harvard Law Review, 1986, p. 1299).  
Additionally, considerations of cultural differences 
when creating law may reduce a trend known in the 
U.S. as “over-criminalization”. Over-criminalization 
refers to the use of criminal law to solve any social 
problem. The over reliance of criminal law enforcement 
occurs because criminal law enforcement is easy to 
arrange, it does not produce immediate economic costs 
and it provides electoral consensus. This trend is 
evident in both Italy and in the U.S. As for cultural 
offenses, over-criminalization is a rough response to 
intercultural problems; instead of setting up integration 
policies, with economic and social interventions, over-
criminalization tends to worsen relations with 
immigrants. Smith (2012) notes that even judges are 
responsible for over-criminalization, by expanding 
criminal statutes. Evidence of this can be found in 
previously mentioned cases in which anti-terrorism 
laws and laws pertaining to weapons possession have 
been applied to cases involving cultural offenses, even 
if these laws were not intended to apply to such cases.  
Laws generally resolve only the most frequently 
occurring and common cultural conflicts. When the 
recognition of culture does not occur at the law making 
stage, criminal cases should be able to present a 
cultural defense. The need for cultural defenses cannot 
be underestimated, as it is impossible to expect that 
the law can foresee and/or consider every situation in 
which a cultural conflict might result. Smith (2012) has 
noted that, "defenses have a vital role to play in 
keeping criminal liability within appropriate bounds” (p. 
577).  
Finally, when cultural factors are not considered at 
the law making stage or law enforcement stage (e.g., 
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trial) there are benefits to considering culture at the 
punishment stage. Punishments that consider culture 
are more socially inclusive and reflective of the goals of 
a democratic state; they ensure that offender 
rehabilitation, the primary aim of the Italian 
Constitution, is prioritized. Without acknowledging that 
the offender’s motivations may be rooted in cultural 
norms and therefore administering a punishment that 
addresses these cultural norms, true rehabilitation is 
not possible.  
Cons 
Arguments against cultural considerations at all 
stages of law enforcement draw attention to the rights 
of the victim. Victims of cultural offenses could be less 
protected than other victims. Because victims and 
offenders often share a cultural background (Kymlicka, 
1995), a cultural defense is criticized because it could 
prioritize the strongest members of the group against 
the traditionally weaker members (e.g., women and 
children). In addition, the recognition of cultural factors 
in the law-making process and in trials is said to be 
able to undermine social cohesion around common 
values. Kim (1997) notes that the law must lay down 
rules compelling obedience regardless of an 
individual’s background, in order to maintain social 
order. A breakdown of social cohesion could adversely 
affect the majority. Majority members could feel 
abandoned by their institutions, in particular the law 
and criminal justice system. Therefore, opponents of a 
cultural defense may deem that it could, in part, deprive 
the existing majority society from its own identity. 
It can also be argued that cultural considerations 
negate the need to rehabilitate the offender. These 
arguments consider cultural offenders to require 
treatment, since they have violated the law. Therefore, 
treatment or rehabilitation cannot be achieved if the 
offense is eliminated, via legal statutes, or justified at 
trial. Furthermore, the behavior of the offender may be 
considered to be hostile and dangerous, and without 
the treatment the offender may pose additional risks to 
society.  
Finally culture, as previously mentioned, is 
something difficult to define in general and even more 
so when applied to the law. Furthermore, the impact of 
acculturation on a society is not static. Therefore, 
culturally rooted patterns of behavior can change when 
they interact with other cultures and as such it is 
arguably difficult to identify which behaviors can be 
attributed to which culture. Likewise, it can be difficult 
to recognize behavior as an expression of culture if 
culture is a result of the integration of foreign values 
assimilation and the reinforcement of the primary 
culture. 
Potential Pitfalls 
One of potential pitfall of considering culture at point 
of trial is that case law, rather than statutory law, is 
better equipped to consider cultural conflicts. Statutory 
law, as is used in Italy, is written law set down by 
Parliament; it produces a rigid arrangement of 
conflicting interests by which only one interest will 
prevail. But, as we have noted, this arrangement works 
only when law deals with frequent, common and minor 
cultural conflict. Other cultural conflicts can amount to 
what Hart (2012) calls "hard cases"; they are cases in 
which there is no automatic "right answer". Italian case 
law, which does not acknowledge precedence, creates 
a situation in which these issues will be continuously 
revisited, even if decided in previous cases. Even if it 
can be a flexible solution for "hard cases", certainty and 
equality might be jeopardized by this trend in countries, 
like Italy, where stare decisis is not strictly binding 
(Basile, 2010; Caputo, 2005). As noted, prior judicial 
decisions do not strictly bind other judges to follow 
them. Although, they have a strong persuasive effect, 
especially when decisions come from the Supreme 
Court of Cassation, Italian judges can decide 
differently. As such, a pitfall of considering culture at 
trial is that, even if it can produce fairer solutions, there 
is no certainty that the results will set precedence.  
In addition to this, Italian jurisprudence is generally 
conservative regarding what Basile (2010) refers to as 
"normative cultural elements" (p. 133). Normative 
cultural elements are words and sentences in laws that 
can be interpreted very differently on the basis of the 
cultural values that are the basis of the interpretation. 
Basile (2010) notes that Italian judges always interpret 
such language of law, which is sensitive to cultural 
background by using stereotyping clauses such as 
“according to mainstream sense”, “according to shared 
social rules”, and “according to cultural common 
heritage”. These clauses suggest that there is a 
generally narrow-minded attitude among Italian judges 
towards cultural diversity.  
Additionally, a general pitfall of culture 
considerations is the potential stereotyping effect when 
excuses, rather than justifications, are used at trial. 
U.S. case law can serve as an example of this. The 
insanity defense is often used as cultural evidence in 
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the U.S., as such in the leading case People v. Kimura, 
No. A-09113 L.A. Sup. Ct. 1985. The defendant’s 
cultural background was used to prove her mental 
instability that, in turn, excused her. This excuse had a 
negative stereotyping effect, treating cultural diversity 
like mental illness. As Reddy (2002) notes, there is a 
trend to pathologize cultural factors; this results from 
attempts to make a defendant's cultural background 
evaluation more accessible to the court. However, it is 
also a manifestation of the preemptive power by the 
dominant culture, which pathologizes the behaviors of 
the minority culture. When this occurs, the majority 
culture assumes the role of healer, responsible for 
fixing the maladjusted minority offender. Paradoxically, 
cultural considerations can lead to the very outcome 
that proponents of cultural considerations would like to 
prevent, cultural exclusion. The social exclusion of 
cultural offenders can result when they are viewed to 
be maladjusted, impaired or primitive people. Even 
more so, since culturally based evidence needs to 
demonstrate that there was a cultural motivation (that is 
to say, the cultural offense has to be the result of a 
group's culture not of a personal belief), the 
stereotyping effect extends to the entire cultural group.  
Finally, all societies, but especially intercultural 
societies, have to cope with the political ramifications of 
culture considerations. Consorte (2013) considers that 
real or supposed failures about immigration policies 
and the emotional involvement of the people conveyed 
through the mass-media may push governments to 
exploit culture diversity in order to gain electoral 
consensus. This is risk worth taking into consideration 
when we elaborate on cultural diversity issues, 
especially referring to criminal law.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Although culture is not the only reason for an action, 
culture has a deep impact on actions; actions are 
hardly ever a rational outcome of the mere awareness 
of right and wrong, but more frequently "right" and 
"wrong" are filtered through cultural values. Therefore, 
it seems clear that Italy’s legal system must address 
one of the products of its newly intercultural society, 
cultural offenses. Previous sections have presented 
Italy’s current stance on cultural offenses by presenting 
relevant laws, cases and reasoning. This section 
presents suggestions for how Italy might incorporate 
culturally inclusive legal remedies when confronted with 
cultural offenses. Before presenting these suggestions 
we must note that cultural considerations at any stages 
should only be applied in the offender’s favor. Insofar 
as a society wants minority groups to accept common 
values, penalizing cultural offenders hardly produces 
integration; rather cultural offenders, who commit minor 
offenses, will be alienated. Cultural considerations at 
any stage, from law creation to punishment that 
consider culture to be an aggravating factor, violate 
human rights considerations and the Constitutionally 
promoted punishment aims. As such, any suggestion 
must be in accordance with implicit and explicit 
directives put forth under the Italian Constitution. The 
Italian Constitution (Article 27) establishes that criminal 
punishment should prioritize rehabilitation as the 
central justification of criminal punishment.  
We assert that Italian law should adopt a multi-
pronged approach when considering cultural offenses. 
First, for minor offenses that do not offend supreme 
interests and are more consistent with culture as a 
fundamental right, culturally inclusive laws should be 
the first attempt to officially recognize culture in relation 
to the law. Second, because no law can be expected to 
remedy all behaviors, justifications should be 
considered when minor cultural offenses are presented 
in Italian courts. Third, when cultural offenses offend 
supreme interests they cannot be justified as a right to 
culture, and therefore such offenses should be 
punished; however, punishments should consider that 
the defendant’s culpability is reduced. Finally, we 
assert that criminal law is not the most appropriate 
place to address interculturalism. All too often the 
criminal justice system is left to handle issues that 
should be addressed by other social institutions.  
Creating Culturally Inclusive Laws  
There is a paucity of culturally inclusive laws for 
what could be characterized as political laziness. Also, 
this issue is politically thorny. The majority constituents 
may rebel if new groups are given consideration; this is 
of utmost concern given the contemporary economic 
turbulence in Italy. Therefore, the Italian Parliament 
rarely passes politically sensitive laws that would be 
more consistent with Constitution, in essence 
delegating political responsibilities to judges who must 
interpret and apply law at trial.  
These political elements are compounded by the 
fact that the Italian legal system does not recognize 
stare decisis (an interpretation oriented towards 
Constitution is not binding for future decisions). 
Therefore, laws are not being passed and culturally 
inclusive legal decisions do not serve as precedent. 
Therefore, we assert that culturally inclusive laws must 
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be created to handle common, frequent minor cultural 
offenses; they are more certain and equitable. 
Moreover, culturally inclusive laws can reduce over-
criminalization. Larkin (2013) addresses numerous 
reasons to avoid over-criminalization. First, he notes 
that if the penal codes regulate too many behaviors, it 
becomes difficult for the average person to know what 
is forbidden; in essence there is no guiding principle. 
Also, the courts will be less likely to curb law 
enforcement excesses, because the police will almost 
always have probable cause to arrest someone for 
something. Finally, the criminal process will be more 
easily influenced or corrupted by special interest 
groups, “because every private party will vie for 
economic rents by making a criminal out of a rival” (p. 
756).  
Although Italy rarely opts for culturally inclusive 
laws, there is at least one instance in which it did. 
Italian law 439/1978 justifies Muslims and Jews animal 
slaughtering practices; these practices are not 
considered to be animal mistreatment crimes, when 
committed in connection with religious slaughtering. 
This law was passed in response to European Directive 
74/577/CEE, which states that every animal has to be 
stunned before slaughtering it. Italian law 439/1978 
(article 4) excludes punishment for slaughtering by 
ritual bleeding. Moreover, the law provides some rules 
to follow in order to balance religious freedom with 
animal pain. The law establishes that experienced 
people must carry out the slaughtering, the knife must 
be sharp, the throat must be cut immediately, and the 
animal must not be upset or frightened. This culturally 
inclusive law is the result of a positive dialogue 
between the Italian Government and both the Islamic 
Cultural Center and the Jewish Community Center who 
asked for permitting such slaughtering. This can 
become a model to follow in order to introduce similar 
laws for other minor but frequent cultural offenses that 
do not necessarily also involve religious considerations 
(e.g., khat usage does not deal with religion, but it 
could be justified by a culturally inclusive law). Also, 
such laws can provide better relations between social 
groups. For instance, without a rule about ritual 
slaughtering Jews and Muslims could have decided to 
buy illegally imported meats, or to slaughter animals in 
a way that could be considered animal mistreatment. 
Culturally inclusive laws can be more practicable 
and flexible than other legal remedies. They also 
address the heart of the matter; they are proactive 
solutions that represent a democratic society 
committed to respecting individual expressions of 
behavior. Finally, culturally inclusive law creation 
should be the bedrock of a democracy. Two of the 
main principles of a democratic state are to ensure 
human rights and represent the will of the people; the 
state, when possible, must ensure these principles 
apply to all people.  
Minor Cultural Offenses: Justifications that Allow 
Persons to Exercise their Rights  
We deem that minor cultural offenses (offenses that 
do not offend supreme interests), which cannot be 
remedied through the creation of culturally inclusive 
laws, should be justified. Justifications are more 
suitable than excuses when applied to cultural 
offenses. First, Article 51 of the C.P (Justification of 
exercise of right) is a solution that targets cultural 
conflicts in minor cultural offenses; when culture as a 
fundamental right is not involved, as such as in cases 
in which immigrants simply ignore criminal laws without 
any reference to cultural conflicts, the offense cannot 
be justified by Article 51 of the C.P. The issue will deal 
with immigrants criminality, but it is a different, though 
related, subject as some evidences show (Foblets, 
1998; Tonry, 1997; Tonry, 1998). Furthermore, there 
are less stereotyping effects; justified cultural offenses 
are not based on a negatively valued motivation, such 
as the ignorance of law, or insanity, but rather a 
positively valued motivation (the exercise of a right). As 
a result, the dominant culture, in cases in which 
supreme interests are not offended must concede on 
the basis of cultural pluralism, which should be valued 
in democratic societies.  
Major Cultural Offenses: Non-Negotiable Interests 
and Sentencing Solutions 
Society must continue to punish certain cultural 
offenses, in order to defend the values of native people 
and victim's human rights, even if punishment must 
never be exemplary or discriminatory. For instance, 
balancing victim protection with individualizing 
treatments for cultural offenders is the very matter of 
criminal law in a multicultural society.  
Therefore, we deem that supreme interests, 
offended by gross violations such as murder, rape, 
kidnapping, torture, segregation and slavery are not 
negotiable. In such cases, even when culture is a 
factor, the action is deserving of punishment. In such 
cases one’s fundamental right to culture cannot be 
considered; this assertion is not based on an 
ethnocentric point of view that privileges predominant 
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values over those of foreign cultures. On the contrary, 
supreme interests are the essential foundation of every 
society, even intercultural societies, and criminal law 
represents the most fundamental mechanism to defend 
them. As Höffe (2001) notes, a true "foreigner" does 
not exist in relation to supreme interests; they belong to 
the heritage of mankind, and criminal laws defending it 
tend to undertake a "trans-cultural foundation" (p. 136).  
Nevertheless, persons who commit major cultural 
offenses should receive a mitigated punishment on 
account of cultural factors. Arguably, the cultural 
offender is less culpable because her/his action is, 
consciously or less, more so influenced by his/her 
cultural norms, on account of the enculturation 
phenomenon. Punishing the cultural offender in the 
same way as an offender belonging to cultural majority 
group would be unfair, because the latter offender's 
reason to act is not situated in a culturally rooted clash 
of values. Furthermore, this inequity would have impact 
rehabilitation attempts; they would be doomed to fail, 
because a punishment perceived as unfair could 
adversely impact an offender’s perception of the 
majority group and its institutions, most notably criminal 
law. Again, an interpretation of statutory law according 
to Italian Constitution should bind judges to evaluate 
cultural factors only as a mitigating circumstance, even 
without a specific law that states this. A mitigated 
punishment can be a reasonable point of balance 
between the necessity to punish supreme interest 
violations and the consideration of the cultural 
offender’s mitigated culpability; rehabilitation could 
produce fairer solutions. Cultural offenders would 
understand that their behavior is not acceptable, but 
they would be aware that the law considered their 
culture, making them more prone to reintegrate 
peacefully.  
Additionally, Article 133 of the C.P. could be slightly 
modified, making rehabilitation purposes clearer than 
they are now. For instance, cultural motivations might 
be explicitly inserted into the article. The article could 
demand a consideration of cultural rules shared and 
observed by cultural offenders' group, whose 
compliance would have influenced a cultural offender's 
conduct. This modification could make judges more 
prone to consider culture at sentencing. Unfortunately, 
it appears that the political and social atmosphere is far 
from allowing Italy to make these statutory reforms.  
Some sentencing guidelines already mentioned by 
Article 133 of the C.P. could serve the purpose of 
mitigating punishment. For instance, by considering 
either “criminal purpose” or “individual, familiar and 
social conditions of the offender” the judges can 
already consider the cultural background of the 
offender, but in the previous sections we have noted 
the paucity of cases considering culture in sentencing 
phase. Therefore, either a new sentencing guideline or 
a re-interpretation of some existing guidelines may 
require an improvement in judicial attitudes towards 
cultural diversity. Additionally, anthropologist and 
sociologist witnesses should be more widely admitted 
in order to highlight the cultural conflict behind the 
offense in the trial. The judge may not have enough 
knowledge to follow the cultural arguments; s/he will 
need an expert witness, usually an anthropologist, 
whose testimony is reliable and relevant (Kim, 1997).  
Is Criminal Law the Right Place to Address Cultural 
Conflicts? 
We think that this overall solution may require a 
balance between criminal law remedies and social 
integration policies. The tensions resulting from 
competing cultural interests cannot be remedied by 
criminal law. This is not to say that decriminalization is 
always advantageous; Hart (1963) notes that the 
majority has the right to follow their own moral 
convictions and preserve their "moral environment". 
However, the preservation of the moral environment 
must be balanced. This balance can only be achieved 
when other institutions, such as social services, the 
educational system and private law further develop 
their cultural integration policies; thus, reducing the 
burden on criminal law solutions. These policies should 
not focus on orientating the immigrant to accept the 
value system, yet rather these integration policies 
should encourage a dynamic exchange between the 
existing majority group and new groups. For instance, 
the educational system could introduce students to 
foreign cultural behaviors, by embracing cultural events 
that promote international cuisines, and scholars and 
writers other than Italians, other Europeans and 
Americans. Likewise, working times should be 
arranged so that ritual times for prayer could be 
observed, and important holidays could be celebrated. 
Cultural conflicts cannot be avoided; humans when 
confronted with anything new are instinctually cautious 
and skeptical. However, Italy must recognition that 
integration and cultural inclusion is good for the sum of 
its parts. The minority culture will feel acknowledged 
and thus be more likely to be economically, politically 
and emotionally engaged residents. The majority will 
feel their culture is worth preserving as policies to 
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integrate new groups simultaneously acknowledge the 
new culture, while maintaining the existing culture’s 
general principles. Furthermore, integration policies 
adopted by various institutions will increase social 
cohesion and reduce unfortunate consequences of 
multiculturalism: animosity, distrust, and intolerance. 
These consequences must be avoided in order to 
promote the goals of the Italian Constitution, which 
“recognize the dignity of the person, both as an 
individual and in social groups.” 
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